DOMINANT DEFENSIVE CYBERWAR

One of the most pertinent examples of defensive hegemonic cyberwar is the use of computer and communication based technologies, including electronic listening devices, motion sensors, infrared heat sensors, and aerial surveillance equipment, along the U.S.-Mexico border to monitor and control the flow of immigrants and drugs into the United States. (Dunn, 1996; Covert Action Quarterly, 1996)

Another aspect of hegemonic capability in defensive systems emerged from the Cold War era nuclear warning systems housed in places like NORAD in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. In Latin America, similar Cold War satellite and radar tracking systems have been augmented by DEA activity in the area. A key node in this network is the Mexico City U.S. Embassy, one of the biggest embassies in the world and key facility for CIA operations in the Americas. (Lumsdaine, 1996). Besides DEA intelligence based in El Paso, a string of military intelligence outposts are located in the American southwest next to or not far the border including: Air Force Intelligence at Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas; Army Intelligence at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; a major facility of the National Reconnaissance Office at Los Angeles Air Force Base at El Segundo, California; the Navy's Pacific fleet based in San Diego; and finally a major Navy radar station in Texas.

Just as hegemonic forces are highly capable in offensive cyberwar activity, they are so in defensive areas. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive cyberwar. It can be argued that the militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border is an offensive and aggressive maneuver aimed at Mexican immigrants, that the United States has little reason to defend itself since immigrants are not launching an invasion.